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Cass R. Sunstein*
We have now had the second impeachment of a President in the
Nation's history, and it is actually the first impeachment of an elected
President. The previous impeachment concerned an unelected President
and was politically inflected in obvious ways after the Civil War and the
death of Lincoln.1 What might be done now, now that it appears to be over,
is to see if we can make something good of it. Often in American history,
when we have had a serious problem, there have been reform efforts that
* Editor's note: Portions of this Lecture are reprinted with permission of the publisher,
Georgetown University and Georgetown Law Journal. © 1998. Additional portions of this Lecture
are reprinted with permission of the publisher, the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania and
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. © 1998. This address was presented at the University
of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law on March 19, 1999 as the annual Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture in Law. To retain the speech's original character, it has been edited only
sparingly. Footnotes have been added where material is directly quoted and where further readings
might prove useful or interesting. A VHS copy of the Lecture is on file with the Florida Law
Review.
** Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School
and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to the faculty and students of the University of
Florida Levin College of Law for their extraordinary kindness on the occasion of the annual
Dunwody Lecture. This Lecture draws, at times very heavily, on two of my previously published
papers: Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEo. L.J. 2267 (1998); and Impeaching the
President, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 279 (1998). I draw on these papers, written well before the
conclusion of the proceedings involving President Clinton, in order to explore some general lessons
that might be drawn from those proceedings. The reader is asked to make allowances for a transcript
of oral remarks.
1, Cf generally WHl/AMH. REHNQUIST, GRANDINQUESTS:THE HISTORICIMPEACHMENTS
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 245 (1992) (discussing the
impeachment of Andrew Johnson).
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have made something bad into something better. It is quite early to get an
historical sense of this astonishing set of events, but maybe it is not too
early to have some preliminary reactions. I am going to propose two
general thoughts and three particular thoughts. So there are really five
thoughts, in sum.
The first general thought is that Congress ought not to renew the
Independent Counsel Act.2 There has been a kind of revisionist learning in
the last weeks that this is an Act that should be salvaged in one form or
another. My first suggestion is that the Independent Counsel Act should be
allowed to die a quiet death in June 1999 when it is scheduled to expire.
There are some general lessons that come from this suggestion. One has to
do with the omnipresent danger of turning political disagreements into
criminal charges-a danger which we saw realized under President Reagan
when allegations of criminality on the part of the President and some of his
top people were widespread. Oliver North went to jail. And, under
President Clinton, we have seen the same thing. This is a pathology when
political disagreements turn into criminal charges.
The other general lesson has to do with the nature of liberty under law.
And here, the suggestion is that one of the most important guarantors of
liberty under law is that prosecutors have a wide range of possible targets
and limited resources. Therefore, most of us are immunized from the
prosecutorial gaze. It is not because there are not things that might raise an
eyebrow once in a while, but because the prosecutor, who has a wide net
and a limited budget, has to focus on really legitimate and extreme cases.
At least, unless something has gone very sour. So the suggestion is one of
the sources of liberty under law is the conventional set-up of the
prosecutor's office, which creates a safeguard against abusive or
individualized charges.
Okay, that is about the Independent Counsel Act.
On impeachment, my suggestion is that the Nation ought to adopt, as
explicitly as we can, a kind of agreement that impeachment is generally,
if not always, limited to large-scale abuses of distinctly public power. The
suggestion is that both parties ought to adopt something like an arms
control agreement-a kind of pact-that says that unless the President has
abused authority in a large way-authority that he or she exercises by
virtue of being President-then the political remedies, the ordinary ones,
of hearings, soundbites, laws, and budget will be the ones that are used, not
the impeachment process. This is a suggestion that there ought to be a
norm of reciprocity, really, within the political process, in which
Democrats and Republicans converge on a judgment that impeachment
should not be used except in the most extreme possible cases. Now, that
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1996).
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notion is intended to pick up on my belief that the impeachment of
President Clinton was unconstitutional, a violation of the constitutional
responsibilities of the House of Representatives. But those who reject that
view might be able to agree on the proposition that impeachment should
be limited to the most extreme cases on the theory, perhaps, that President
Clinton's case was one of the extreme cases, for reasons I will get into.
I now have three more minor suggestions. The first quick one is that the
Supreme Court's decisions in Morrison v. Olson' and Jones v. Clinton4
were disastrous, and, in retrospect, astonishingly obtuse. If you read Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison, he nailed the objections to the Act
a long time ago. In Jones, the Court suggested that a civil action against the
President could not possibly divert the President in any serious way. These
decisions were disastrous and obtuse, but they were nonetheless correct;
the remedy for them, therefore, is statutory and not constitutional. The
recent rebellion against the Supreme Court is not born out by the nature of
the cases.
The second proposition is the saddest of the whole set. And, that is, we
now have fresh reason to doubt the fashionable ideas that constitutional
interpretation ought to be a responsibility of legislatures and that we ought
to have some optimism that legislatures can carry out the task of
interpreting the Constitution fairly. In reaction against, I think, the Warren
Court's aggressive use of the Constitution, there has been a lot of
suggestion, crossing political lines, that we ought to entrust our elected
representatives, more than we have, with the job of thinking seriously
about the Constitution's meaning. This is just one incident, and it is an
unusual one, but it does supply some new grounds for skepticism about the
notion that constitutional interpretation on the legislature's part can be
immunized from partisan-even grossly partisan-considerations. This is
the least happy note.
My last ancillary suggestion is that it is not correct to say that the law
of sexual harassment is broken. Many people have held the law of sexual
harassment responsible for the events of the last two years. But, it does
need to be fixed-in one smallish, but quite important, way.
To orient discussion, let us think a little bit about what the founders of
the Constitution tried to create, and how they tried to create it. We might
think, as a kind of shorthand, that they had a picture of democracy which
had a revolutionary feature: they wanted to combine a high degree of
political accountability with a commitment to deliberation and reason-
giving. They sought to ensure that outcomes would be supported by
reasons, not just power, and that if public force was going to be used
3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
against someone or on someone's behalf, there ought to be a degree of
reflection first. This notion was that we would have a deliberative
democracy combining popular responsiveness with reason-giving. What
the Framers added to that goal was an understanding of likely incentive
effects of different institutions. And, at their most ingenious, what they
sought to create were institutions that would have a realistic picture of
human nature, and would use that in the service of the ideal of deliberative
democracy. The notion of national representation, of which Madison was
so fond, was designed to ensure a kind of separateness from the play of
faction, so that representatives could engage in deliberative tasks. In
Madison's words, this would allow our representatives "to refine and
enlarge" the public view, rather than just replicate it.5 That is to suggest
that we might think of the Constitution's structure as attempting to wed an
ideal-that of a deliberative democracy-with some mechanisms which
were attuned to incentive effects. What institutions will have what
incentive effects on what people?
Now, let us turn to the Independent Counsel Act, and think, in
particular, about the incentives it creates for the most important actors in
our system, such as political officials generally; the media; and the
independent counsel, herself or himself. If you look at political officials
generally, any party that is out of power is under tremendous pressure by
virtue of the Act's existence to call for the appointment of an independent
counsel when allegations of wrongdoing are made, and to draw attention
to the independent counsel's activity or inactivity as the proceedings go on.
Under the Independent Counsel Act, whenever a party is out of power, one
or more members of that party have a tremendous incentive to call on the
Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel, to ensure that serious
allegations of wrongdoing are taken seriously by someone who is not in the
President's pocket. It is no wonder that no matter whether that Congress
is controlled by Democrats or Republicans, no matter which is in the
majority or minority, a certain number of members of the party opposed to
the president in office will spend a considerable of time calling for the
appointment of an independent counsel. So much so, that the pressure to
appoint an independent becomes for an administration nearly irresistible.
Hence, it is the case that every administration since the Independent
Counsel Act has been enacted has been subjected to an independent
counsel investigation at least once.6 It is not as if corruption is high; it is
that the incentive effect is created by the Act for members of the opposing
party, and the ability to resist that pressure on the Attorney General's part
is extremely limited.
5. Tm FEDERALST No. 10 (James Madison).
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2283
(1998) (providing an appendix detailing investigations under the subject Act).
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Politicians who think the appointment of an independent counsel would
not be a good idea-it would be diversionary or such-are unlikely to
resist their fellow Democrats' or fellow Republicans' pleas, because it
makes them look soft on corruption or soft on the opposing party. So, the
pressure for opposition and scandal-mongering is very hard to resist for
members of the opposing party. If we look at the media in particular, the
Framers hoped that the media would serve the interest of having a
genuinely deliberative democracy. But in the current media, it is no news
to say that there is a tendency for sensationalism. What is a little more
interesting is to suggest the way in which the Independent Counsel Act
feeds and aggravates that tendency, by diverting attention from problems
such as the increase in asthma in the inner-cities to such problems as
whether the Vice President made the phone call from the wrong office. The
truth is that scandals sell, and newspaper people know that fact. They are
under tremendous pressure to cover political scandals, even if they would
like not to.
I remember fairly early in the Lewinsky scandal, I had a call from
someone at the Washington Post. And this was frustrating to get these calls
about details of where someone was and where some piece of clothing
was. So I said to the reporter, "Don't you wish you were working on
something else? Do you ever get sick of this topic? It seems to be what you
are spending all your time on." And she said, "I hate my job. I really went
into this because I wanted to cover things that really mattered to people.
But, if we don't do it, some other newspaper is going to. And, if they do,
and we don't, we're going to be at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace. The editors know that, and we're stuck." They are in kind of
a race to the bottom with respect to competitive pressures. The
independent counsel is not responsible for the tendency, but the Act tends
to aggravate it, insofar as attention to complaints of criminal allegations
tends to sell newspapers and attract viewers, and not doing that has the
opposite effect.
Let us think for a moment about the incentives faced by the
independent counsel himself or herself. What got me thinking about this
was not the Clinton administration's difficulties with independent
counsels, but the Reagan administration's. In particular, the sad tale of
Theodore Olson, the Assistant Attorney General of the Morrison and Olson
cases. He was and is an extremely honorable person who defended
President Reagan quite vigorously against allegations that the Justice
Department had wrongly invoked executive privilege in connection with
investigations of environmental policy. He testified very vigorously before
Congress. Some members of Congress alleged, implausibly, that he
perjured himself. Now, if you can name cases in which perjury before
Congress has resulted in serious criminal investigation, you are an expert.
If you can name cases in which people have perjured themselves before
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Congress, you just watch T.V.
The number of cases in which people are subject to serious criminal
investigation because of misstatements before Congress is either trivial or
zero. Nonetheless, Olson faced several years of serious criminal
investigation, spending millions of dollars of his own money to fend off an
indictment which was, after those years of investigation, ruled meritless by
the independent counsel herself.
The problem is that from the standpoint of the independent counsel,
you have one person to focus on and there are two options: indict or not
indict. Not to indict looks like a waste of time, indictment looks heroic-a
kind of Archibald Cox act. The distortion stems from the fact that the
independent counsel, unlike most prosecutors, has one target rather than
many and an unlimited rather than limited budget, which produces an
incentive for zealotry. This is not a suggestion that any one of the
independent counsels is dishonorable or part of a conspiracy or anything
like that. It is a suggestion that the problems we have seen under the Act
are a natural product of the incentive effects of the office of the
independent counsel, which creates a kind of fixation on particular people
and particular events with a kind of bias toward detailed investigation and,
ultimately, indictment.
Cases that ordinary prosecutors would spend no more than ten minutes
on (or no time at all) become the occasion for weeks, months, years of
investigation. For public servants generally, the Independent Counsel Act
creates a bad incentive, too. Everyone who accepts a Cabinet-level post
knows that the possibility is far from trivial that they will be subject to an
independent counsel investigation and, ultimately, be indicted-even if
they are like ordinary people or a little worse or a little better. The risk of
a credible and specific allegation being made against anyone in the
position to be appointed to the Cabinet is pretty high, and everybody
knows that before the fact, which creates a disincentive to become a public
official. It is not the worse thing in the world, but it is an adverse effect.
Now, as a good Chicagoan, I am required by my contract to use the
words "cost benefit analysis" in every talk, and to undertake a little cost
benefit analysis. And, we would have to say that, on the benefit side, there
is something rather than nothing. That is, the Act does deter official
wrongdoing and it has punished genuine official wrongdoing. Judge Starr
has found some and Judge Walsh did, too. So, it is not as if there is nothing
on the benefit side. But the cost in terms of the incentives created for the
independent counsel, the media, members of opposing parties, and
prospective public servants is extremely high, and it would be very good
to try to figure out a way to obtain the good without the bad.
Now we probably do not have to be very adventurous to think about
how to do that. For over 180 years of the Republic's history we have had
serious investigations of wrongdoing on the part of high level executive
[VCOL 51
DUNWODYLECTURE
branch officials. They came from the United States Department of Justice.
Sometimes, in the extraordinary cases, the Department of Justice would,
by regulation, create an independent counsel, and the system worked pretty
well; it was not broken. The Watergate example, sometimes taken to be the
strongest argument on behalf of the Independent Counsel Act, seems more
to be the strongest argument against the Independent Counsel Act. The
Watergate situation was handled not with an independent counsel statute
but with some combination of ordinary Justice Department activity and
political safeguards. You will recall that President Nixon had Archibald
Cox fired-unlawfully, by the way. He was, by regulation, an independent
counsel, and President Nixon replaced Archibald Cox with another
independent officer, Leon Jaworski-who did his job well. The system
worked plenty well enough without an Independent Counsel Act.
There is no reason to mend rather than end this Act, because any
version of the Act that results post-mending will continue the tendency, in
one form or another, to abridge the safeguard provided by wide focus and
limited funds, or to continue the trend to turn into criminal charges
essentially political disagreements. There is no reason for the Nation to
continue to face those dangers. If we go back to the old regime which
worked plenty well enough, we will do just fine. So much for the
Independent Counsel Act.
What about impeachment? Well, if we want to come to terms with the
constitutional words "high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"7 we would like to
probably look at the matter in two different ways. If we have a Justice
Scalia-like approach to the Constitution, we will want to do it from the
standpoint of the original understanding. What did the Founders think in,
say, 1789? If we have a different approach to the Constitution, we might
look at the whole picture of our constitutional history to try to figure out
the kind of implicit common law of impeachment that the Nation has
followed. Let us do it both ways, briefly.
If you look at the Constitution, the terms do not tell you a tremendous
amount--'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Can we get anything out of that language if we try to transport ourselves
in a time machine back into 1789? Well, maybe the keyword in the phrase
is "or"-"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 9
We might think to ourselves that these ambiguous terms, "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors," ought to be understood by seeing what the Framers'
defining central cases were. This is nothing like a decisive legal argument,
but it is suggestive. If the Framers were thinking of "treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors" you might think that they were
7. U.S. CONST. art H, § 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
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thinking of things of the same kind and magnitude as treason and bribery.
And, at the time of the Founding, there is no question that "treason" would
mean basically what everyone today would think it means.
There is also no question that "bribery" would not mean bribing an
official to call traveling when it was very dubious in the last seconds of a
basketball game. What was meant by "bribery" was something more like
taking money from a foreign nation in order to do something different from
what you would otherwise do, or going to members of the Electoral
College and paying them to vote for you. Those were actually the examples
discussed at the time of ratification. When we think of "treason, bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors" we might think that what we are
after is an abuse of the authority that people have in virtue of being in the
relevant office. So you might think that if the President, in a time of war,
decides to sleep eighteen hours a day because it is kind of scary and
intimidating, that would be impeachable. Even though it is not a crime, it
might qualify as a "misdemeanor" as it was understood in 1789. Or, if the
President decides to use the CIA in order to harm his political enemies,
there would be no "treason" and no "bribery," but there would be a large-
scale misuse of distinctly presidential power.
That is kind of a glance at the text. If we look at the original
understanding, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, we can fortify
that view by noticing that the question, "What were the legitimate grounds
for impeachment?", was debated in detail at the Convention itself.
Contrary to what has been suggested, this was not an issue on which the
Framers said little and left answers to posterity. They said a fair bit. A
number of people in the constitutional Convention did not want
impeachment at all. They claimed that this would be a recipe for factional
fights, hence defeating the system of separation of powers, which could be
ensured only if the legislature could not remove the executive.
That was a strongly held position in the Convention. The key people
who held it yielded by reference to examples of cases in which the
President basically sold the country out during wartime. The swing votes
agreed that treason and bribery would be legitimate reasons for removing
a President from office. That is basically where the Constitution stood until
September, which were the closing days of Constitutional drafting.
At the last moment, George Mason, someone who had been persuaded
to support impeachment, said that treason and bribery are too narrow.
What if the President subverts the whole Constitution, ignores it, doesn't
pay attention to it, doesn't do what the President's authorities are, or does
something inconsistent with his distinctly presidential authorities?
Shouldn't we allow discharge for "maladministration" also? Madison, at
that point, said no, maladministration is too vague and too broad. That's
no good. We need a more specific form of words. At which point the
Framers put in the words "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors against
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the United States,"1 clearly signaling Mason's concern that you could have
things that were like treason and bribery-offenses against the Nation as
such, that did not qualify-that should be grounds for impeachment, too."
The words "against the United States" were deleted by the Committee
on Arrangement and Style, which had no authority to make substantive
changes, and thought, it appears, that they were just eliminating
redundancy. 2 It turned out to be an important act by the Committee on
Arrangement and Style. In any case, it seems pretty clear that by the period
1789, 1790, and 1791, there was general agreement that the defining cases
for impeachment, at least, were large-scale abuses of distinctly presidential
authority. Thus, what President Clinton did, and some of what President
Nixon was alleged to have done, do not fall within the cases that the
Framers had in view, however egregious some or all of those things are.
If we look forward and get a sense of our constitutional history, we will
notice a remarkable fact: a tradition of forbearance and restraint on the part
of both parties, even in an extraordinarily large number of cases in which
something other than forbearance and restraint might have been expected.
Here is an historically non-exhaustive list of cases.
President Nixon, as noted, was alleged to have behaved dishonestly
with respect to his tax obligations. Many Democrats concluded that that
was not a legitimate basis for impeachment because it did not involve
misuse of presidential power. And they self-consciously decided not to
include that among the grounds for impeaching President Nixon.1
3
President Reagan, it was alleged, sold arms unlawfully to the Contras,
and there was extensive discussion of this. Vice President Bush, it was
alleged, was also involved in the deal, in violation of the Boland
Amendment, which expressly prohibited this kind of transaction. For all
of the noise and fury over President Reagan's allegedly unlawful acts, there
was no serious talk, at any point, of impeachment. There was an
unwillingness to invoke the kind of artillery that would destabilize the
Nation, even the face of allegations of unlawful transfers of arms to a
nation with whom our relations were quite complex.
It is clear that President Eisenhower lied to the country, very
prominently, at least twice. Once he lied in connection with the downing
of a U.S. airplane over Russia, which Russia claimed was a spy plane.
Eisenhower said that it was not; he knew that it was. It turned out that he
had to agree that it was, eventually, because the evidence was
10. Id.
11. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERALCONVENTIONOF 1787, at 499-551
(1966).
12. See id. at 600.
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 296 n.70
(1998).
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overwhelming. He also lied to the country about transferring arms to an
unfriendly nation in return for the release of hostages. He said that it did
not happen. It did-the documents are crystal clear.
President Roosevelt transferred arms to England under the precursor of
the "Lend-Lease" program which became a statutory program. This was an
unlawful program in which Roosevelt transferred the arms to England in
such a way as to concern the Secretary of Defense about what the Secretary
of Defense thought was, this is a quote, "illegality and deception." 14 There
was no serious talk, even when the facts came to light, that President
Roosevelt should have been impeached.
President Kennedy, in addition to his sexual misconduct, was
romantically involved with someone who was romantically involved with
at least one high-level member of the Mafia. 5 Now that goes beyond
sexual recklessness. That puts the activities of the Justice Department at
risk. Nonetheless, even the people who knew it did not think that this was
legitimately impeachable.
In context of the Vietnam War, maybe the largest social upheaval since
World War ]I, President Johnson was subject to tremendous criticism. He
lied to the country on numerous occasions about how things were going
and about what was planned. However, not even his fiercest detractors
undertook a serious impeachment effort.
President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War. The courts told him that that was unconstitutional. He basically
ignored what the courts told him to do, thereby continuing to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. Even his detractors did not come close to suggesting
that this violation of the Constitution's habeas corpus clause was a
legitimate ground for impeachment.
Now, I do not mean to suggest, by any means, that any of these cases
were appropriate cases for impeachment. I do not think any of them were.
What I mean to suggest, instead, is that there has been a kind of national
convergence, a tacit, case-by-case common law notion that impeachment
should be reserved only for the most extreme possible cases of abuse of
distinctly presidential authority.
How ought we to think of the impeachment of President Clinton in this
light? The most obvious conclusion is that there was only one legitimate
impeachment article: the one claiming the President misused his
presidential power to get his staff and so forth to lie on his behalf. That is
the only article that comes within the ballpark. The allegations of perjury
14. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law
of Neutrality, 1935-1941, 3 BuFF. J. INr'LL. 413, 486 (1996-97).
15. See, e.g., Dangerous World: The Kennedy Years (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 4,
1997) (reporting that Judith Campbell met Kennedy through Frank Sinatra, became Kennedy's
lover, and was "involved in Kennedy's secret dealings with the Mafia").
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and obstruction ofjustice, while quite serious and severe-these are, after
all, felonies, and are nothing to laugh at or trivialize-are not legitimate
bases for impeachment, even though they are legitimate bases for criminal
punishment.
To the suggestion that this means the President of the United States can
continue to serve if he or she is a felon, the answer is: absolutely. That is
our Constitution. The Constitution does not make the President removable
for the commission of a felony; it makes the President removable for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, ' 16 and those
are not the things at issue.
To the suggestion that this means the President can continue to serve,
even if he has violated the rule of law, the answer is the most obvious
proposition in the whole debate-that Presidents frequently have violated
the rule of law. President Truman seized the steel mills, President Johnson
probably violated the law several times in connection with the Vietnam
War, while President Roosevelt and President Eisenhower certainly
violated the law. Violations of the rule of law do not make out an
impeachable offense.
Maybe the deeper problem is that it is going to be very hard in practice
to distinguish this impeachment from other imaginable grounds for
impeachment that will arise in the future. This is not to say that what
President Reagan did is worse than or better than what President Clinton
did. It is only to say that reasonable people go both ways on that issue. So
long as we have reasonable people going both ways on that issue, this
impeachment, as a precedent, threatens to undo our common law
understanding of what the legitimate grounds for impeachment are, and
what the nature of the standard is.
The upshot of all this is that there are two ways to read the recent
events, and either, for the purposes just suggested, would be good enough.
One way-the preferred way-is to say that this is like the impeachment
of President Johnson, which historians have found a partisan matter in
which those who resisted impeachment were heroes. Of course, this is not
to say that President Johnson did not violate the law-he did. He fired a
Cabinet head in violation of a statute. Nonetheless, that was a partisan
impeachment, and a highly destabilizing event where the impeachment
device was used as a political tool. The best notion is that the Clinton
impeachment was illegitimate and ought not to be repeated.
An alternative reading-which Republicans in favor of impeachment
seem to be converging toward-is to say that this was a legitimate
impeachment because of the very unusual and genuinely egregious nature
of the President's misconduct in connection with the criminal justice
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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system. What is unusual about this view is that the President committed
quite serious crimes in the course of activities which frequently place
ordinary citizens at risk. This does not endanger the general principle that
impeachment is generally for cases of large-scale abuse of distinctly
presidential power. All this means is that this-President Clinton's
particular crimes of perjury and obstructing justice-is one thing that does
not fall within "generally." In other words, it is a narrow exception to the
Senate prerequisite.
You will have noticed that I prefer the view that this was an
unconstitutional impeachment to the second view, that this was a
legitimate, but narrow, case of impeachment. But either will do the trick
for the future. Either will work for posterity. Those are the main
propositions. Here are three littler ones.
Number one: It has become very popular to blame the Supreme Court
for causing all of this. It has become popular to blame the Supreme Court
on the theory that none of this would have happened if the Court had
struck down the Independent Counsel Act in Morrison v. Olson, or if the
Supreme Court had not allowed the civil action to go forward in Jones v.
Clinton. Justice Scalia is not a gloater, but he must have been something
like the most gratified man in Washington to hear people who do not
normally like Justice Scalia quoting him and admiring him for his
prescience. And his dissenting opinion against Morrison was really on the
money about the nature of the Independent Counsel Act and the incentives
it creates. The problem with the claim that the Supreme Court was wrong
in Morrison is, in my view, that it is not very easy to come up with a
constitutional argument that legitimates the invalidation of the Independent
Counsel Act.
At the time of the Founders, it is not at all clear that the people thought
that all prosecution needed to be under the arm of the President. Indeed, at
the time of the Founding, and for about a hundred years afterwards, U.S.
District Attorneys were not in law or in fact under the power of the
President of the United States. It was only about a hundred years later that
the Department of Justice was created and started centralizing everything.
The notion that prosecutorial authority must, by virtue of being
prosecutorial, be under the President's arm, finds no good home in the
Constitution's original understanding. Now, maybe we could come up with
an argument that would not be based on the original understanding, but
that would suggest that the Independent Counsel Act should be doomed on
constitutional grounds. Maybe the argument would have roughly the form
that the Independent Counsel Act abridges liberty because of the narrow
focus and unlimited budget. But that has a kind ofjerry-built quality, of the
sort that the Warren Court has been reasonably criticized for using to
invalidate legislation. And the Supreme Court's reluctance to invalidate an
act of Congress made a certain intuitive sense: we do not want people who
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are investigating the highest officials in the land to be subject to discharge
by the highest official in the land.
The notion that that reasonable judgment by Congress is
constitutionally illegitimate seems extremely adventurous. So this is my
suggestion: Justice Scalia had the policy right, but he did not have the
Constitution right. And the proper remedy, as Justice Scalia often says, for
an objection of this kind, is political and not constitutional. The same thing
might be said about Jones v. Clinton. After all, there are some immunities
in the Constitution-the Speech or Debate Clause, for example, gives
Congress immunity with regard to speeches on the House floor; but there
is no express presidential immunity from civil suits.
If I may, I will just tell you alittle bit of an exchange I had when I was
testifying in Congress.17 The members of Congress were extremely upset
about the notion that the President could not be punished for these possibly
criminal activities until he was out of office-which is my view. Congress,
meanwhile, is protected against any kind of action for speeches and
debates on the floor. There is nothing foreign to our traditions, in order to
serve the public, of creating certain protections against civil and criminal
actions. There is nothing new about that. Congress, itself, benefits from
that. Indeed, there are several implied immunities in the Constitution. I am
sure that you know about them. But they often come from thinking that the
relevant officer cannot possibly perform his job if the relevant officer is not
going to be immune.
As disastrous as Jones v. Clinton turned out to be, it is a pretty unusual
case. And the notion that the President cannot perform his job if he is
subject to civil actions seems odd. Most people, probably some in this
room, have performed theirjobs while being subject to civil actions. There
is nothing completely disabling about a civil lawsuit. The Supreme Court
rightly resisted the claim to build up from an ambiguous constitutional text
an immunity that certainly is not there and that is not a necessary
implication from it. As in Morrison v. Olson, the proper remedy to the
policy problem-which Justice Breyer uniquely identified-is statutory,
not constitutional. Congress should, it seems to me, pass a law saying that
while the President is in office, he or she cannot be subject to civil actions,
but the statute of limitations is not going to bar suits that are brought the
day after he or she leaves. That is not to protect the President. That is not
our concern. It is to protect the country, which is the same theory that
underlies the narrow account of the legitimate grounds for impeachment
that the Founders adopted and that I have tried to emphasize here.
A further point is that many people have suggested that Congress ought
17. See Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const. (Nov. 9, 1998) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
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to-and, if encouraged, will-take its constitutional obligations quite
seriously. And we ought not to think of the judiciary as uniquely invested
with power to think about the meaning of the Constitution. But in this, the
most public encounter between our elected representatives and the
Constitution of the United States, there were many troubling features.
Many members of Congress repeatedly suggested that any crime or
violation of the oath of office or violation of the "take-care" clause calls
for impeachment, even though the Constitution unambiguously says
otherwise, and even though many people, including members of those
representatives' own staffs, were told that the Constitution expressly says
otherwise.
The overwhelming majority-and the word "majority" states it too
weakly-of constitutional law teachers believed that President Clinton
committed possibly felonious acts, but not impeachable acts. The
overwhelming majority of Constitutional Law teachers may have been
wrong-and this would not be the first time. But the vote in the House of
Representatives split, astonishingly, along partisan lines, and the witnesses
before the House Judiciary Committee consisted of a handpicked group of
people. You had to search very far and wide to find nine constitutional
scholars who thought President Clinton's impeachment was legitimate.
Congress searched far and wide and found nine, and they opposed those
nine to the hundreds of others who disagreed. The best way to predict
members' judgments about the constitutional issue was looking at party
affiliation. Nothing else was nearly as good-geography, law degree,
gender, race-nothing else was nearly as good as party affiliation.
My fellow llinoisan, Congressman Hyde, the Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, consistently argued that this was a process mandated
by the Constitution, and that the Constitution required its continuation-as
if anything in the document meant that the process had to continue as long
as possible. There is nothing in the document supporting that judgment.
This is not a reason to give up on the notion, that constitutional
interpretation within the Congress of the United States should play a larger
role and have a bigger place. But it does provide some new basis for
skepticism about the possibility that it can be done on either side in good
faith.
What about the law of sexual harassment? Many people have urged that
the two culprits are the Independent Counsel Act and the law of sexual
harassment. In my view, that has half of the picture right, because there is
nothing to blame in the law of sexual harassment. Jones's own case was
a tough one, and the District Court, rightly or wrongly-but certainly not
unreasonably--dismissed the case. This does not suggest that the sexual
harassment law is out of control, or a basis for crazy lawsuits. On the
contrary, if anything, it is just the opposite. But there is one problem, and
it is not trivial.
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The problem that turned up is that in any case involving a sexual
harassment allegation, it is apparently open to the plaintiff, at least in some
trial courts, to undertake fairly extensive discovery about the consensual
sexual activity of the defendant. That is bad for two reasons. One reason
is that it opens up to public view activities that may well have a legitimate
claim to secrecy. The other problem with this is that it creates a
tremendous weapon to extract settlements. Now we do not know the
magnitude of the problem, but from talking with trial judges, I, at least,
have a sense that this is not a trivial problem. It happens.
What might be done about it? Well, the first notation is let us not
overreact. There are two sides to the story. Sexual harassment cases
generally involve no witnesses, and the only way the plaintiff can prove
that this happened was to show that there was a pattern. Moreover, the only
way that he or she, usually she, can prove that there is a pattern, is to try to
get other instances before the trier of fact. So, if you say that you cannot
ever inquire into activities that the defendant says were consensual, you
may insulate defendants from accurate charges. Again, there are two sides
to this.
What might be done? Well, here are two tentative suggestions about
how to fix this not huge, but not trivial, problem. One is to have secret
proceedings to make sure everything is sealed. The other is to condition
certain questions on the part of the plaintiff on a prima facie showing that
her case has merit or that the activity she wishes to discover was not
consensual.
It is time, now, to conclude. My first suggestion is that the Independent
Counsel Act should be permitted to expire. It serves as a case study in the
law of unintended consequences. This, after all, was a statute designed to
increase trust in government, yet it has had exactly the opposite effect. The
way high-level illegality ought to be handled is through the ordinary
procedures of the Department of Justice, which is filled with civil servants
who know what they are doing. Furthermore, the great run of cases can be
entrusted, and the exceptional cases can be handled, as in the Watergate
era.
The second proposition is that, with respect to impeachment, it is very
important that the nation converge, regardless of what we think about the
impeachment of President Clinton, on the proposition that impeachment
of a President is exceedingly rare, and is generally, if not exclusively,
reserved to high-level misconduct on the President's part. It involves the
misuse of authority that he or she has by virtue of being President. That
tracks the original understanding of the Clause and our practices since the
Constitution was ratified.
I ha-ve also suggested that we ought not to blame the Supreme Court in
Morrison and Jones v. Clinton; the Court did what it was supposed to do,
and there are statutory remedies for the problems created by these cases.
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There is fresh reason to be uncertain about whether Congress can be
trusted to interpret the Constitution fairly. At the same time, the law of
sexual harassment, while hardly the culprit, has a problem-a problem that
I have a hunch can be fixed, pretty reasonably.
One final note: After most scandals in our history, what we try to do is
devise institutions so that the underlying conduct that created the scandal
cannot occur again. I think that is the unbroken pattern of our scandals.
This one has a unique feature: Everybody agrees that the President's
underlying conduct was very bad. But the primary focus on both sides is
to try to figure out institutional remedies that will assure the country that
the institutional problems that accompany the scandals will be alleviated.
This is a scandal where primary attention is not on the activity by the
individuals who caused the scandal, but the institutional mechanisms that
made it take the form it did. I think that is wise.
My final suggestion is that the way to make some progress on that is to
return to the Founders' aspiration to have a deliberative democracy. Such
a democracy is not overrun by passions of the moment, but instead, weds
an understanding of that aspiration with some judgments about the likely
incentive effects of different governmental institutions.
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